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Abstract	
In the history of life sciences, it has often been argued that the individual organism emerged, 
around 1800, as a four-dimensional entity – a temporalized entity. Against this backdrop, the 
article asks how research on development contributed to structuring the time of the organism 
in terms of a historical process, that is, by understanding a given phenomenon as brought 
forth by what preceded it and as establishing conditions for what will follow, thus relating the 
past, the present and the future in a specific way. To shed light on this conceptualization, we 
must take into account not only embryological research on morphogenesis but also 
physiological research on the genesis of vital functions and the causation of congenital 
anomalies. Three layers of structuring time in such research may be discerned: the making of 
a trans-natal continuity of the developing organism; a conceptualization of birth as a threshold 
of past and future that paradigmatically reveals the historical understanding of such 
developmental continuity; and an approach to intergenerational transmission that confronts 
developmental continuity with historical contingency. My contribution focuses on the work of 
William T. Preyer and Charles Féré but, in a genealogical vein, situates their work in the 
larger context of nineteenth-century research on development.  
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Traversing Birth. Continuity and Contingency in Research on Development in 
Nineteenth-Century Life and Human Sciences 
 
In 1880, ending a talk on “psychogenesis”, the physiologist and psychologist William Thierry 
Preyer gave himself over to a kind of epistemological vertigo as he mused on the object of his 
research:  
 
To be sure, when I look back over my work, those daily attempts, for years, to fix 
processes of development, it seems to me as if I stood at the banks of a shining stream 
that constantly gains in breadth, flows at an accelerating pace and into whose clear 
waters I plunge my searching gaze without gaining ground, even when no wanton 
wave curls its surface. Amazed and mute we stand before the eternal enigma of 
becoming [vor dem ewigen Räthsel des Werdens]. […] We marvel at our development 
and do not understand it. (Preyer 1880, 237)1 
 
When Preyer described his labouring over the “enigma of becoming”, he stood at the 
intersection of two disciplines concerned with human development: embryology and child 
psychology. A gifted synthesizer of scattered research traditions and wider research trends in 
the human and the life sciences, in both fields he staked claims to broaden research 
approaches: while embryology, he argued, must ask not only after the “genesis” of form but 
also after the “genesis” of vital functions, psychology could not begin with the born child but 
must also take into account the unborn one. By implication, he had two disciplines converge 
in a perspective on human development that would assert not only a continuity between 
physiological and psychological processes, but also a continuity between the unborn organism 
and the born human subject – or, more precisely, that would assume the latter on the basis of 																																																								
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this article are mine. 
3 	
the former. Better than in any declamatory statement, this claim is encapsulated in the 
chronology of Preyer’s books on the topic. The 1882 publication of his highly influential Die 
Seele des Kindes (first translated into English in 1888–9 as The Mind of the Child), which laid 
out the “mental development of the human being in the first years of life” (Preyer 1882/1905), 
was followed just one year later by the appearance of Specielle Physiologie des Embryo, 
which presented a host of research on embryo-foetal circulation, oxygen supply, nutrition, 
metabolism, secretion, motility, sensibility, growth, and so on. Although in this arrangement 
the unborn and the born were treated separately, the separation was merely technical, 
designed, as Preyer writes, to “make it easier both for the investigator to do his work and for 
the reader to follow the exposition of its results” (Preyer 1882/1905, ix). It did not imply an 
epistemological division, since the research task remained the same in both books: to study 
the child, “both before birth and in the period immediately following, from the physiological 
point of view, with the object of arriving at an explanation of the origin of the separate vital 
processes” (Preyer 1882/1905, ix).  
 
Preyer’s endeavour offers a salient entry point for this article, which introduces additional 
protagonists and moves further back in time in order to inquire into temporal concepts in 
research on human development in both the human and the life sciences. Preyer is particularly 
interesting because his work and its reception reveal the convergence of two research fields 
equally relevant to this article: firstly, a research tradition stemming from the early 
nineteenth-century engagement with development from a physiological perspective, and, 
secondly, a heterogeneous research field inquiring into the circumstances of the becoming of 
the human organism before birth in terms of its impact on the born human subject. I will 
discuss the first of these approaches, using Owsei Temkin’s terms (1950), as “historical 
physiology”, and the second as the “epistemic space” (Rheinberger and Müller-Wille 2007) 
that, from the late nineteenth century on, took shape under the heading of the “prenatal” or the 
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“antenatal”. While Preyer systematized a vast amount of the practical research that had been 
carried out over the nineteenth century in the first field, his own work served as a reference 
point for subsequent authors engaged with the second.  
 
It has often been observed that the living emerged, in the eighteenth century, as a four-
dimensional entity, “indissolubly joined not only to the space that surrounds it, but also to the 
time that has moulded its present structure” (Jacob 1973, 130). “Time was indeed the measure 
of all things”, writes William Coleman (1977, 10), and Michel Foucault argues that from the 
nineteenth century on, “History … defines the birthplace of the empirical, that from which, 
prior to all established chronology, it derives its own being” and which brought forth the 
human as an object of scientific disciplines (Foucault 1974, 219 and 263–279; see also 
Lepenies 1976). This historicity of the living emerged in a twofold form: as phylogenetic 
“evolution” and as ontogenetic “development”. The living being was understood as the 
product of both the history of its ancestors and the transformations that brought about its 
individual organism (Jacob 1973, 130).  
 
Situating my contribution within this broad context, a heuristic specification is in order. If in 
some of the passages quoted above – and in my assemblage of them – “temporality” and 
“historicity” are lumped together, it is important to point out that they are not synonymous in 
describing the “four-dimensional” conceptualization of the living. When the passing of time 
came to be understood as “history”, a particular interpretation of temporality was at work: a 
view of a given phenomenon as having been brought forth by what preceded it and, in turn, 
establishing conditions for what would follow (Temkin 1950, 234; Koselleck 1985).2 Thus, to 
conceive of organisms and species as “historical” implied more – or, according to Foucault, 																																																								
2 Whether a temporal process grasped in terms of a historical process is conceived of as teleological or 
contingent was, in the nineteenth century, a matter of interpretation, especially when the notion of evolution 
shifted between a “developmental” and a “genealogical” approach (Bowler 1996). 
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even something else – than placing them in the flux of time: it endowed the time of the living 
with an explanatory principle, in that its features were seen as derived from a specific nexus 
between the past, the present and the future. François Hartog has coined the term “regimes of 
historicity” (Hartog 2003) to draw attention to the fact that there are different ways of relating 
past, present and future in terms of “the historical”. To carefully describe these different ways 
and, more generally, to understand temporality-as-historicity not as self-evident but as, 
precisely, the thing in need of interpretation is to enable a more far-reaching examination of 
the temporality of the living. Asking how a specific regime of historicity operated in sciences 
of the developing organism, I will investigate the concerns at stake in conceptualizing 
relations between the past, the present and the future. Continuity and contingency, that is, the 
intervention of non-determined events in a continuous process, I will argue, were such 
concerns.  
 
The research problem that brought forth “development” in early nineteenth-century 
embryology was the question of how to think of an organism that presents an organized 
structure while also undergoing permanent change (Wellmann 2010, 115–116). The concept 
of rhythm, as an interplay of repetition, regularity and variation, offered an answer to this 
question (Wellmann 2010).3 But while rhythmic development could account for the continuity 
of an ever-changing organism with regard to morphogenesis, the question arose afresh, this 
time from the perspective of a physiological and psychogenetic approach and moving beyond 
embryology, with regard to the change that an organism underwent through the single and 
momentous event of birth. In this context, I argue, the present and the future of the organism 
were related to each other in the mode of a historical connection that on the one hand 
accounted for the continuity of the developing organism, yet on the other raised the question 
of contingency. This nexus, unfolding in research on development through the nineteenth 																																																								3	On	the	making of “development” in a later phase of embryology, see Hopwood 2000.	
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century, comes to light when such research is investigated as a comprehensive, markedly 
transdisciplinary field that comprised physiological, psychological and pathological 
approaches.  
 
I develop this argument in three sections. In the first, I ask how early nineteenth-century 
physiology brought forth a developing organism characterized by trans-natal continuity. 
Examining subsequent psychophysiological research on the newborn that drew on this 
concept, in the second section I show how this organism was conceived of as producing 
continuity by converting past into future. The third section turns to prenatal pathology as it 
was researched in the late nineteenth century, to shed light on how such continuity was 
coupled with the question of contingent events that interfered with development. In 
conclusion, I suggest that a concern to account for continuity and contingency constitutes a 
common matrix that brought forth the historicity of the living with regard to phylogenesis and 
ontogenesis alike. 
 
Beyond embryogenesis: The making of trans-natal continuity  
When William T. Preyer published his book on the “special physiology of the embryo” in 
1883, he insisted that his research program was both an integral part of and a challenge to 
embryological research, calling for an end to embryology’s indifference towards physiology 
and for attention to what he designated “physiological embryology”, “biochemical and 
physiological embryognosis” or “functional embryology” (Preyer 1883, 1–3). Despite 
terminological similarities, his claims departed from embryology’s then current turn towards 
“physico-chemical techniques and explanatory principles” as stipulated by the embryologist 
Wilhem His in 1874 (Coleman 1977, 54). His’s call for a “physiological morphology” was 
eventually answered when embryology turned from a descriptive and comparative science 
into an experimental science under the heading of “Entwicklungsmechanik” in the 1880s 
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(Coleman 1977, 53–54; Maienschein 2003, 13–88; Mocek 1998; Hopwood 2009). However, 
although the discipline had now shifted from its previous concern with describing embryonic 
forms to studying their biochemical causation, it continued to focus on morphogenesis and 
thus the early stages of development. For Preyer, in contrast, taking account of physiology 
meant moving the focus from the emergence of embryonic form to the vital functions of the 
formed organism. This surpassed the temporal scope of the embryological discipline: for 
Preyer, physiological embryology begins where morphological embryology ends, once 
embryonic forms are attained, and it ends not with birth but with the first intake of food 
“outside the egg” as the final event of the physiological adaptation that was triggered by birth 
(Preyer 1883, 17).  
 
Preyer may not have been in tune with the kind of physiological turn that contemporary 
embryology was approaching. But he addressed physiology as well as embryology, calling on 
physiology to take a “genetic” approach by concerning itself with the foetal organism. With 
regard to this claim, Preyer, who presented himself as the founder of a new discipline and has 
been received as such both by his contemporaries and by historians of science (Fischer 1999, 
393), should probably be regarded instead as a “systematizer” of a continuous stream of 
research being carried out throughout the nineteenth century. The Entwicklungsgeschichte of 
vital functions for which he called can be traced back to early nineteenth-century 
engagements with development from a physiological perspective. Though closely associated 
with the establishment of epigenetic principles in embryological research and increasingly 
focusing practical work on “developmental morphology” (Lenoir 1982), such engagement 
initially reached beyond embryogenesis as just one, albeit a fundamental, subject of a more 
comprehensive “historical physiology” (Temkin 1950, 234–236). Ignaz Döllinger, for 
example, a teacher and collaborator of Pander and von Baer and an important initiator of 
physiological work, thought of development as an ongoing, life-long process that extended 
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from conception to death and consisted in a constant renewal of conception (Döllinger 1842, 
3–4).4  
 
Döllinger is interesting because he gives a precise definition of what “historical” meant and 
why it had explanatory value:  
 
In this course of life and passing of existence the single phenomenon itself cannot 
have any significance for itself; for everything that at a certain time appears as part of 
the process has its peculiarity only by what preceded it and thus prepared it and gave 
rise to it. And its value consists merely in its contribution to the establishment of a 
coming stage of development. Thus, the knowledge of individual human existence 
cannot truly be other than historical. (Döllinger 1842, 3–4)5  
 
Since here the individual organism is subject to permanent development, physiology is 
history, and any explanation of the individual organism over the course of life has to be 
historical. It attests to the coherence of his approach that Döllinger addressed research on 
foetal oxygen supply by refuting the notion of “foetal respiration” as anachronistic – that is, as 
methodologically flawed historical thinking:  
 
In a study whose principles are to be founded solely on a strictly historical course, the 
question of how the foetus breathes can actually not be raised, since this is only the 
detection of an early surrogate for a phenomenon that occurs in the later periods of 
development, flying in the face of every sense of history [allem historischen Geiste 
zuwider]. (Döllinger 1842, 379)	 																																																								
4 Döllinger here sets out what Claude Bernard later called “silent embryogenesis”, that is, the life-long 
reconstruction of the individual organism (Prochiantz 2012, 41–56). 
5 Temkin’s translation (Temkin 1950, 234).  
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Preyer does not mention Döllinger, although he would have found his own claim laid out in 
Döllinger’s fragmentary and incomplete work, for instance in his review of the development 
of blood circulation by progressing from the embryonic through the foetal to the born state. 
He does reference, however, a prizewinning 1824 article by the young Johannes Müller that 
dealt with “the physiology of the foetus” firstly by describing the form and functional features 
of the fertilized egg and its envelopes, and secondly by presenting numerous vivisectional 
experiments on foetal oxygen supply in rabbits and sheep (Müller 1824). Müller like Preyer 
took care to emphasize the distinctly physiological approach of his work by crediting 
Meckel’s and Serres’s work on “morphogenesis” (Bildungsgeschichte), while simultaneously 
arguing that it could be ignored for his own work since it was “more closely affiliated with 
morphology than physiology” (Müller 1824, 423).6  
 
Like Döllinger’s, Müller’s physiological approach to the unborn called on physiology to 
apply a developmental perspective on vital functions beyond both embryogenesis and birth. 
The chapter “On Development” in the second volume of his 1840 handbook on physiology 
discussed the egg, the embryo, the foetus, birth and “developments after birth”. Admittedly, 
he considered the last point to be of minor relevance: “Developments continue after birth and 
through a large part of life without, however, being as fundamental as in foetal life” (Müller 
1840, 764). For Müller and other physiologists – especially Karl Friedrich Burdach, to whom 
Müller referred his readers for more information – development after birth was not the 
constant fundamental transformation that Döllinger postulated, but the succession of different 
“Lebensalter” (Müller 1840, 765–766). Yet common to both Döllinger’s more radical and 
																																																								
6 Such remarks can be situated within the context of physiology’s struggle for a disciplinary autonomy from 
anatomy, which accompanied the presentation of the functional approach as an integrative perspective on the 
study of the organism (Canguilhem 1970; Prochiantz 1990, 55–56). For Müller’s efforts in this context, see 
Hagner 1992. 
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Müller’s more moderate approach was the idea of a trans-natal continuity of the developing 
organism. While in Müller’s account birth leads from fundamental to more peripheral 
developmental phenomena, in Döllinger’s it moves the developing organism from one life 
period to the next by changing its “externality” (Aeusserlichkeit) without altering its 
developmental impulse. There is the period before birth, when the organism is part of the 
maternal body’s externality and strives for a “free earthly existence of its own”, and the 
period after birth when the organism is part of the externality of the “earth” while fending off 
the earth’s invasive forces in an ongoing effort to achieve and maintain “autonomy” 
(Selbständigkeit) (Döllinger 1842, 278–379). Sharing this concept of birth as a passageway 
that alters the organism’s relationship to what is external to it while preserving organismal 
continuity, Müller writes that through birth, the child becomes an “autonomous” 
(selbständiger) body “foreign to the uterus” (Müller 1840, 760). 
 
These descriptions not only shed light on how the period before birth was inserted into a 
continuous course of life; they also attest to a distinctly physiological notion of gestation and 
the unborn that began to emerge in the eighteenth century and was consolidated throughout 
the nineteenth century. When William Hunter proved, in his Anatomy of the Human Gravid 
Uterus (1774), that the unborn did not partake in the maternal blood circulation, long-held 
doubts as to whether the pregnant woman and the unborn constituted an organic unity gained 
new momentum.7 Hunter’s demonstration was followed by a large amount of anatomical and 
experimental research on the placenta as an organ that differentiates the unborn from the 
maternal body while simultaneously connecting them through the provision of nutrition and 
oxygen. Such research on gestation coincided with the ascendance of the notion of the 
“organism” as a “generic name of individuals” in natural philosophy and a “structure-function 
complex” in research on the living (Cheung 2010, 156, 178). In the first decades of the 																																																								
7 Uncertainty continued throughout the first half of the nineteenth century (de Witt 1958). 
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nineteenth century, a notion of the organism as a “living, individualized entity” (Cheung 
2010, 179) that was always also bound to an environment or “milieu” (Jacob 1973, 155) 
became established in various research fields.  
 
In this context, the unborn, no longer understandable as an organic part of the maternal body, 
became instead a “biological object” of its own (Duden 2002, 11), that is, an individual 
organism residing in the maternal organism as its specific milieu. What was once an organic 
unity was now regarded as a relation of “communication”, “correlation” or “exchange” 
between two individual organisms. In this vein, Burdach’s handbook of physiology shows 
both the “mother” and the “embryo” as “individuals aspiring to a peculiar existence or trying 
to maintain such an existence, but both also constitute a community, they interact and are 
dependent on one another” (Burdach 1828/1837, 105–106).8 Johannes Müller describes the 
“connection between mother and child” in terms of a “juxtaposition as intimate as possible of 
two actually completely self-contained beings, which attract each other on their respective 
surfaces, one of them giving the nutrition and warmth of which the other takes possession” 
(Müller 1840, 574). Not surprisingly, this concept of gestation is frequently anchored in the 
observation that the embryo “does not receive its blood but generates it itself” through active 
“appropriation” (Aneignung) (Burdach 1828/1837, 799). 
 
Hence there is, contrary to Temkin’s interpretation (1950, 236), nothing “strange” about the 
fact that Döllinger develops his argument on the two phases in the life of the human 
individual – before and after birth – in a chapter on the cardiovascular system, describing 
them as “two main epochs in the genesis of the circulatory system” (Döllinger 1842, 279).  
																																																								8	While always postulating it, physiologists were less concerned with the mother’s “dependency” on the embryo. 
This can be explained by the fact that the developing organism of the unborn was at the centre of their respective 
thinking. However, the issue merits more research, which probably would have to take into account how 
obstetricians and gynaecologists received physiological knowledge production on gestation. 	
12 	
When interpreted from the perspective of the connection between the emergence of historical 
physiology and a concept of gestation centred upon the becoming of an individual organism, 
this textual organization makes perfect sense: the time periods before and after birth can be 
presented as two phases with regard to the continuous individual organism that passes from 
one phase (where its blood circulation depends on the maternal organism) to the other (where 
it has achieved autonomy from the maternal organism). Development in utero was thus 
understood as a “gradual achieving of self-containment” (Burdach 1828/1837, 3). 
 
However, the assumption that the unborn was an individual organism dependent on “the 
organic influence of maternal life”, and thus “characterized as mainly a product”, both 
established and dissolved its distinction from the born, since “the individual organism never 
ceases to be a product” of its external milieu (Burdach 1828/1837, 3). This concept of trans-
natal continuity is exactly what can be found in Preyer’s 1883 book. He describes birth as a 
passage from water to air, from darkness to light, from silence to noise: as a continuous 
organism changing its milieu (Preyer 1883, 6). That passage is certainly relevant, since it 
provokes profound functional adaptations; but it is just one event in a developmental 
continuum.9 The researcher’s gaze has to cross birth in both directions, and most significantly 
so when it comes to the issue of psychogenesis. Turning now to this field, I will show how 
trans-natal continuity was made not only in concepts but also through research practice, where 
it became apparent as a specific way of relating the past and the future.  
 
																																																								
9 In the same vein, philosophy of life science today considers “birth and hatching as arbitrary time markers for 
the beginning of the organism”, since “life in the embryological environment and life after birth or hatching are 
more continuous than it might appear” (Nuño de la Rosa 2010, 299). It is not the concept of trans-natal 
continuity itself, in the sense of ontologically conflating the born and the unborn, that is novel to modern life 
sciences – such continuity was already conceived of in ancient and theological embryologies that assumed 
“ensoulment” at a specific moment before birth. However, within the context of modern life sciences the 
question has been posed in a novel way, as one of organismal continuity that cannot deliver a definite answer to 
the question of when the unborn is ontologically equivalent to the born. The political and ethical implications of 
this problem are well-known. 
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The developing organism at birth: Converting past into future  
In 1893, the French philosopher and educationist Gabriel Compayré noted “that there is no 
more interesting moment to study in the life of the child than that in which he comes into the 
world” (Compayré 1893/1900, 28). Including a chapter on the newborn in his study of the 
“intellectual and moral development of the child”, Compayré took up Preyer’s call to 
conceptually unite research on the child before and after birth. Preyer’s work on the embryo 
and psychogenesis is frequently cited in Compayré’s study, and he appears on the scene on 
the second page as a commendable example of those  
 
diligent and eager observers […] who lose no time, who do not wait even till the child 
has had five minutes of existence before taking him to the window to see what effect 
the light of day exercises upon his eyes; who do still better than this, even, since they 
anticipate the complete birth, and profit by the fact that the child’s head appears first, 
to experiment upon the force of his instinct of suction by putting the end of his finger 
in his mouth. (Compayré 1893/1900, 29)10  
 
Compayré’s work is just one example of literature in the nascent developmental psychology 
of the period that took the newborn as a starting point and presented birth as a territory for 
practical research. For this field, Preyer served as a crucial reference. In an extraordinarily 
detailed account based on observations and experiments, in the first section of his Seele des 
Kindes of 1882 Preyer described the “development of the senses” in the newborn and the 
infant, examining vision, audition, touch, taste, smell and feelings of well-being, dislike, 
hunger, saturation, fatigue, anger and surprise (Preyer 1882/1905). Preyer’s interest in the 
newborn drew on historical physiology and the concept of the trans-natal continuity of the 																																																								
10 Preyer’s books appeared in French translation in 1887. As early as 1881, his article on psychogenesis was 
published in French in the Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, a journal edited by Théodule 
Ribot as an organ for clinical psychology and experimental psychophysiology (see, e.g., Mucchielli 1998). 
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developing organism I have described above. The same impulse to investigate the newborn 
had been pursued by Adolf Kussmaul, who was one of the many physician-scientists 
influenced by Johannes Müller (Schafer 2009, 27–28). In 1859, Kussmaul published a short 
and subsequently much-cited book entitled Untersuchungen über das Seelenleben des 
neugeborenen Menschen as a contribution to the study of the “evolution of the human soul” 
(Entwicklungsgeschichte der menschlichen Seele) (Kussmaul 1859, 6). In its first section, he 
reviewed statements on the sensual capacities of the unborn and the newborn ranging from 
antiquity to the present. In the second, he presented his own research, which consisted in 
observing newborns and testing their reactions to sensory stimuli, for example their facial 
reaction to tasting bitter or sweet substances.  
 
As a research object, the newborn served, on the one hand, as an ersatz object in human foetal 
physiology because it could substitute for vivisection. Preyer thus presents research on 
newborns as one way to cope with the impossibility of “observing the [human] foetus in its 
natural environment and investigating its vital expressions while it is still developing in the 
uterus” (Preyer 1883, 6–7). If only the physiologist could have access to what he calls “just-
born children” (ebengeborene Kinder) (Preyer 1883, 5), he would get a glimpse of the unborn 
human organism otherwise hidden away in the female body. On the other hand, the newborn 
was a research object in its own right when examined from a psychogenetic perspective – and 
that perspective was inscribed from the outset into the physiological engagement with the 
developing organism.  
 
When physiologists, psychologists and physicians put their finger in the mouth of a not yet 
fully born child, when they made the newborn taste quinine and sugar, when they exposed its 
eyes to a moving candle and brought chinking bells to its ears, tickled its tongue with a glass 
rod and made it smell acetic acid and ammoniac, they did so in the context of a physiology of 
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the senses and its postulate of a psychophysiological continuum. The idea that psychological 
phenomena were rooted in physiological processes – and that physiology would thus yield 
psychological knowledge – was formulated “most forcefully and precisely” by Johannes 
Müller in the early nineteenth century (Hagner 2008, 239; Hagner and Wahrig-Schmidt 
1992). Bypassing the question of how the psyche was localized in the brain, and searching for 
a viable experimental approach to the body-mind interaction, Müller saw the physiology of 
the senses as a way of conflating physiological and psychological questions. His endeavours 
were imbued with a developmental perspective, since it was then widely assumed that a 
human organism’s potential culminated in psychic phenomena (Hagner 2008, 238–239).  
 
This physiology of the senses subsequently informed both Kussmaul’s and Preyer’s work. 
Preyer states that “the foundation of all mental development is the activity of the senses”: 
“We can not conceive of anything of the nature of mental genesis as taking place without that 
activity” (Preyer 1882/1905, 1). From this perspective, sensation is the organismal feature that 
generates the trans-natal continuity of the organism: “Everything goes to show a continuity in 
the capacity of sensation” (Preyer 1882/1905, xiv).11 Accordingly, he concluded his book on 
foetal physiology with a chapter on “embryonic sensibility”, followed only by a short chapter 
on embryonic growth, while his book on the child starts with a chapter on the “development 
of senses and feelings” in the newborn and the infant, followed by chapters on the 
development of volition, reason and language. Embryonic sensibility was thus inserted into a 
continuous process of successive stages in the child’s development, and a focus on the senses 
is what makes research on the unborn overlap with research on the born. This approach 
brought forth the newborn as a research object in its own right.  																																																								
11 Preyer’s argument is twofold: he assumes on the one hand that sensual capacity develops through external 
stimuli and the ensuing activity effective before birth; on the other that a phylogenetic heritage is present from 
the beginning in every new organism. He brings the two points together by arguing that psychic capacities are 
given but have to be “awakened” (Ottavi 2001, 131; see also Canguilhem et al. 1962/2003, 91–92; Eckardt 
1989). 
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However, its epistemological significance went beyond that of supplying knowledge about the 
organism at the moment of birth. What became manifest in research on the newborn was 
development as a process that extends over time in a way that refers the researcher 
simultaneously to what came before and what will come next in order to assess the meaning 
of the given present – which itself is understood as a product of the past and a condition of the 
future. In Preyer’s book this logic can be seen in the textual organization, but in Kussmaul’s 
writing, as in that of many other authors, it manifests on a linguistic level. There, it is the 
notion, recurrent in the language of “historical time”, of the “already” (Koselleck 1985) that 
defines the unborn by the born and vice versa: “When man, coming from the mother’s womb, 
enters this life, he already possesses a well equipped sensorium […]. Yet the newborn 
possesses not only excellent instruments […], but already in the maternal body has begun to 
make use of some of them and, despite the adverse conditions of that place, has gathered 
some experience and capacities” (Kussmaul 1859, 35; original emphasis).12  
 
Within this research context, birth is demoted to being a mere event in an organismal 
continuum, based on the assumption of psychophysiological continuity, yet also valorized as a 
privileged means of gaining knowledge on development. This is no contradiction. If birth 
serves as a means to research the features of the (past) unborn with regard to the (future) born, 
it yields an “epistemic thing” (to use Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s term) that is defined not by the 
momentary event that produces it, but by this moment’s relationship to the past and the future. 
The newborn is no longer foetus and not yet child, but also still foetus and already child; it 
refers to what it was and what it will be, and thus conflates a past made for the future with a 
future conditioned by the past. The continuously developing organism is not one that moves 
																																																								12	To be sure, consensus on how to assess sensual activity before birth from a psychogenetic point of view was 
far from having been achieved, and controversies continued long after the nineteenth century.	
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through a continuous stream of time, but one that brings forth continuity by incessantly 
converting past into future. Conceptualized thus, the developing organism is divested of a 
present that can, in research, be construed only through artefactual objectivation in an 
experimental setting. Hence the obsession with the passing of time in research on the 
newborn. When Preyer laments the “merely external mischief” of the distance between the 
physiological laboratory and the delivery ward, which impedes “many attempts to experiment 
methodologically with newborns” (Preyer 1883, 5), the problem is actually anything but 
external: to merge the two settings spatially would mean nothing less than to temporally 
synchronize being born and doing research, in a futile attempt to arrest the time of 
development – precisely the fantasy at work when physiologists rush into delivery wards and 
put their fingers in the mouth of the child during labour. 
 
Gestational accidents: Contingency in development  
I have argued that the developing organism was, in nineteenth-century physiology, conceived 
of as bridging the unborn and the born by continuously converting past into future. However, 
birth still being (from a physiological perspective) a specific transformational event, such 
continuity raised the question of how what happens to the organism before birth impacts on 
its future after birth. The long-standing phenomenon of congenital anomalies and disease thus 
came to be understood in these terms when it began to be examined within the context of the 
physiological conception of gestation described above. A crucial author in this field was the 
French alienist Charles Féré, who undertook a series of experiments on development in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century and was subsequently often cited alongside Preyer.  
 
Féré too was interested in the foetus from a psychophysiological perspective. He turned to the 
unborn when researching sensory-motor physiology and seeking motoric equivalents to 
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“psychic operations” (Féré 1886, 261).13 Foetal movement, he argued, can be understood as a 
mediated version of the sensorial excitation that effects muscular contraction: the pregnant 
woman’s sensations lead to contractions of the uterus that are felt by the foetus, which, in 
turn, begins to move (Féré 1886, 261). Although Féré here entered a long-standing 
controversy about the nature of foetal movement, his main concern was not to prove foetal 
sensation. When he argued, on the basis of experiments and reports by women, that the foetus 
“reacts, in its uterine cave, […] to any sensation, whether perceived or not, and to any of its 
mother’s mental representations”, he was concerned first and foremost with the link between 
the maternal and the foetal organism (Féré 1886, 256–258). And this concern was framed not 
by an interest in psychogenesis but in pathogenesis. Thus, in a remarkable argumentative leap, 
Féré’s article on “foetal psychology” concluded with the hypothesis that repeated and intense 
sensorial or emotional excitations in the pregnant woman might irritate the nutritional bond 
and the foetal nervous system, thus producing congenital pathologies (Féré 1886, 260). 
 
This hypothesis could not be evaluated within the confines of sensory-motor physiology. In 
the following years, Féré therefore replaced pregnant women with chicken eggs and turned to 
“experimental teratogeny”, continuing the work of Étienne and Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 
and, especially, Camille Dareste (Oppenheimer 1968; Fischer 1986). Following their 
example, Féré shook, varnished, and perforated eggs, varied their temperatures and positions, 
immersed them in vapours of musk, phosphor and ammoniac. In addition, aiming to put 
teratogeny in the service of “general pathology”, he varied experimental intervention by 
injecting “toxic substances” (alcohol, cocaine, etc.) and “microbic toxins” (syphilitic 
substance, etc.) – that is, by introducing elements that correlated with toxic and infectious 
phenomena in human medicine. Summarizing his results, Féré argued that nutrition was the 
																																																								
13 The article appeared in the same review as the French version of Preyer’s paper on psychogenesis (see 
footnote 11). 
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medium through which substances that caused disease in pregnant women exerted a 
pathogenetic effect in the unborn. This result was indeed of general pathological relevance, 
since it could also be demonstrated that the same substances which produced morphological 
anomalies in an early developmental state caused functional anomalies such as infertility, 
morbidity or debility in a later developmental phase (Féré 1899).  
 
Joining research on teratogenesis with research on pathogenesis, Féré established a unifying 
category. Malformation and congenital morbidity were two manifestations of the same 
phenomenon: “Like monstrosity,” Féré argued, “morbid predisposition is the result of 
troubled evolution” (Féré 1894, 446). They differed not in being different effects of different 
causes but in having the same causes but different effects according to the period of gestation 
when they intervened, gestation itself being structured by developmental stages. This insight 
was immediately taken up and terminologically codified by the Scottish gynaecologist John 
W. Ballantyne. He envisioned the founding of a new discipline called “antenatal pathology”. 
Its novelty, Ballantyne argued, consisted not in its choice of subjects, that is, “monstrosities”, 
“foetal diseases” and “morbid predispositions”, but in integrating them into a single research 
perspective concerned with “all the morbid processes which act upon the organism before 
birth” (Ballantyne 1902, 1–2; Al-Gailani 2010).14 This category of the “prenatal” restates the 
double feature of birth described above: while birth on the one hand marks an 
epistemologically relevant discontinuity, in that it distinguishes what happens before in terms 
of its impact on what comes after, it is also just one event among others in the continuous 
aetiology of the organism.  
 																																																								
14 Ballantyne did not invent the terms “antenatal” or “prenatal” (or, in German, vorgeburtlich) that were used 
here and there by other authors, among them Preyer, early in the nineteenth century. However, he was the one to 
give the term a programmatic momentum at a time when authors were still vacillating between a spatial and a 
temporal conceptualization, using “intrauterine” and “antenatal” in parallel. An example is Ballantyne’s French 
counterpart Adolphe Pinard (Herschkorn-Barnu 1996). On “the prenatal”, see also Arni in press and Arni 2012.  
20 	
As for its subjects, Féré’s research did indeed continue traditional medical interests in the 
origin of congenital disease, morbidity and malformation.15 What enabled him to integrate all 
these, however, was the physiological conception of gestation as the time period in which the 
organism was characterized by residing in a specific milieu in the mode of dependency on the 
maternal organism. “Morbid processes” acting “before birth” could thus be thought of as 
pathogenic “influence”. The quest for such “influence” informed and integrated Féré’s 
bifurcated approach to research on the unborn, motivated as it was by the question of whether 
the trauma experienced by besieged Parisian women during the Franco-Prussian War in 
1870/71 and the Paris Commune uprising in spring 1871 might be the cause of the 
disproportionate incidence of behavioural anomalies in children conceived at this time 
(Legrand du Saulle 1884; Féré 1884). Tellingly, Féré posed this question in terms of “psychic 
influence”.  
 
However, while in the physiological conceptualization of gestation upon which Féré draws 
any organism, born or unborn, is subject to a milieu, in the case of the unborn this milieu is 
itself an organism. More precisely: its milieu is the organism which brings about the unborn 
through a procreative process – one now no longer understood as a single act of parents 
generating a new human, but rather as the continuous reproduction of the species, linking 
generations as its specific actualizations (Rheinberger and Müller-Wille 2009, 31–63; Parnes 
2007; Parnes, Vedder and Willer 2008). In the case of gestation, then, environmental 
influence is a medium of intergenerational transmission: the experience and life conduct of a 
pregnant woman translates into the features of the prospective child by conditioning and, in 
some cases, detrimentally interfering with its development.  
																																																								
15 It also dovetailed with the medicalization of the foetus that had taken off in the first part of the century 
(Herschkorn-Barnu 2002) and with long-standing theories of manipulative interventions aiming for the 
“perfection” of the prospective child (Fischer 1991; Carol 1995). Féré showed explicit interest in how nutrition 
might be used to create conditions favourable for development (Féré 1894, 452). 
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This implication explains Féré’s interest in developmental pathologies, since he was not only 
an alienist engaged in psychophysiological research but also a contributor to the Société de 
biologie who was deeply interested in the vexed question of heredity and “degeneration”. 
Hence his concern, when drawing conclusions from his research on chicken eggs, to 
distinguish prenatal pathology – which he called “morbid heredity” caused by “accidents of 
conception or gestation” (Féré 1886, 259) – from “heredity”: “Exposing the influence of most 
varied toxic substances in the milieu where the embryo develops, [the experiments] point, in a 
general way, to the degenerative quality of troubled parental nutrition; but they do not directly 
touch upon the question of heredity” (Féré 1899, 367; see also Féré 1894). In arguing thus, 
Féré continued a long-standing French interest in the causation of congenital anomalies by 
way of “heredo-intoxication”; that is, the infliction of a physico-chemical injury on the germ 
and the developing organism by its milieu (Mendelsohn 2001). This “accidental” origin of 
pathology was distinguished from “true heredity” as the regular reproduction of parental 
pathological traits in the offspring (Mendelsohn 2001, 40).16 However, they were treated 
together since they both explained the pathologies of the child as related, in one way or the 
other, to mechanisms operative in the procreative act, in other words as revealing various 
mechanisms of transmission. Even when, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
concept of the gene arose and the notion of heredity was narrowed down to the transfer of an 
assumed stable hereditarian substance, these “dual approaches to transmission” continued 
(Gaudillière and Löwy 2001, 7–9). Significantly, later authors referred to Féré’s work under 
the heading of the “prenatal” (e.g. Vignes 1924) as well as by continuing the notion of 
“morbid heredity” (e.g. Apert 1919). 
																																																								
16 The terminological overlap of “true heredity” and “morbid heredity” reveals that, in nineteenth-century 
France, interest in heredity arose in a medical context (Lopéz-Beltrán 2004, 2007) which had to account for both 
phenomena. Hereditarian medicine thus was “as much a medicine of reproduction and development as of the 
‘true heredity’ that most of its practitioners were able to distinguish” (Mendelsohn 2001, 40). 
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To conceive of development as a continuous process, brought about by an organism that 
constantly converts its past into its future, inevitably raised the question of contingency, a 
question inherent to any historical process not regarded as predetermined. Prenatal pathology 
can be understood as a way of dealing with the disconcerting issue of contingency in the 
developmental process. Because contingent events in the sense of gestational “accidents” 
were, furthermore, addressed as an interference with transmission, such contingency 
concerned not only organismal but also intergenerational continuity. Contingency happened 
when two generational times coincided in the developing organism through its physiological 
relationship to the maternal “milieu”: during gestation, the present of the mother becomes the 
future of the prospective child if accidental events and circumstances belonging to the 
biographical time of the mother (her diseases, nutritional deficiencies, traumatic experiences, 
etc.) deform the future, that is, the biographical time of the prospective child. As a result, Féré 
could present the detrimental influence of a mother’s organism as an instance of 
“degeneration”.17  
 
Conclusion 
Understanding the living organism as the product of the time that brought it about implied 
making connections between the past, the present and the future that were not self-evidently 
given. This article has explored the making of continuity and contingency in the developing 
organism across birth. I have argued that, in early nineteenth-century physiological 
approaches to gestation and development, the unborn was conceived of as an individual 
organism whose developmental trajectory traversed birth, thus instituting continuity between 																																																								
17 It is important to note that Féré adhered to a concept of “degeneration” as formulated by Bénédicte Augustin 
Morel in 1859. Morel had argued within the context of milieu theories and thus stressed accidental and 
environmental causes; the stable transmission of specific anomalies was only one, and not the main, 
manifestation of “degeneration” (Mendelsohn 2001, 43–44; see also Carol 1995). On prenatal pathology and 
transmission, see also Arni in press. 
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the unborn and the born. This notion informed subsequent research on psychogenesis, in 
which the development of psychic capacities after birth was related to their physiological 
conditions developed before birth. By analysing the practical problem of such research – the 
impossibility of capturing a specific moment where the physiological becomes the 
psychological – I have shown how the developing organism emerged as an organism that 
makes its continuity by incessantly converting past into present. Examining research on 
congenital pathologies attributed to the interference of accidental causes in development 
before birth, I have argued that this connection between the past and the future, bringing 
about continuity, was also conceptualized as being open to contingent events which could 
intervene during the course of development and produce discontinuity in the shape of 
anomalies. 
 
 In The Logic of Life, François Jacob specifies four elements at stake when modern life 
science conceptualized the temporal nature of the living with regard to phylogenesis: “origin”, 
as all living organisms can be traced back to the emergence of life on earth; “continuity”, as 
the living is generated from the living through the mechanism of reproduction; “instability”, 
as variation can occur within this mechanism; and “chance”, as there is no intention inherent 
to nature which would direct transformations over time (Jacob 1973, 130). The becoming of 
the individual organism has been inscribed into this history of the living in complicated ways, 
most notably in the debates on recapitulation (Gould 1977; Canguilhem et al. 1962/2003). 
Some of the authors dealt with here took part in that debate, most prominently Preyer 
(Eckardt 1989). Instead of examining such couplings of ontogenesis and phylogenesis, I have 
chosen a different angle by focusing quite strictly on the temporal concepts that informed 
research on the individual organism. Nevertheless, in an examination of how the past, the 
present and the future were interrelated in concepts of the developing organism across birth, 
continuity, contingency and, by implication, discontinuity have also come to the fore.  
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I would thus like to suggest that it was a concern to account for mechanisms of continuity and 
to know about the workings of contingency that constituted a common matrix of structuring 
time in research on the living with regard to both phylogenesis and ontogenesis. This concern 
was deployed in a variety of research contexts, also including post-Revolutionary social and 
political theories (Parnes 2007). They came together not in a unifying concept but in 
“transient contact areas” (Rheinberger 2001, 197) between different fields that regarded 
phenomena as being brought about by historical time. When historical time as a productive 
temporal nexus – bringing forth phenomena – necessitated the conceptualization of concrete 
mechanisms of continuity, discontinuity – perceived in terms of “degeneration” with regard to 
the social body, “anomaly” with regard to the individual organism, or “revolution” with 
regard to the social and political order – loomed large as a possible outcome of the historical 
process. The “regime of historicity” brought about by relating the past, the present and the 
future to each other in the mode of continuity thus implied a notion of the past as a possible 
danger for the future. Hence, the spectre of discontinuity warranted action in the present – 
such as prenatal care (Al-Gailani 2010; Herschkorn-Barnu 1996) – and thus brought forth a 
further way of relating times to each other: namely, when the future determined the present in 
the mode of “anticipation” (Adams, Murphy and Clarke 2009). That, too, may have been at 
stake when Preyer, almost in shock, marvelled at the “eternal enigma of becoming” (Preyer 
1880, 237). 
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